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1. Introduction 
In the Japanese Civil Code we can find two kinds of legal relation-
ship between parent and child: real parent and child in blood and 
adoptive parent and child based on adoption. These are brought forth 
either by a certain fact (birth) or by a certain procedure (notification of 
adoption). This means， ifthere is not such a fact or a procedure， a legal 
relation of parent and child does not come into being between the persons 
concerned and no legal effects cannot be expected. On the other hand， 
however， judgements， theories and special laws admit that there can be 
some cases where the persons concerned are protected just like the real 
legal parent and child. These people are called “adoptive parent and 
child in fact" by judgements， theories and special laws. In many cases 
there is no blood relation between the adopter and the adopt~d child， but 
we can often find that the real father and child in blood are regarded as 
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“adoptive parent and child in tact". In short， this conception，“adoptive 
parent and child in fact'¥is employed in case they want to give some legal 
effects to the ilegal parent and child. It is the purpose of this article to 
explain how the relation of “adoptive parent and child in fact" come forth 
and what kinds of legal protection are given to them by judgements， 
theories and special laws. 
1. Formation of Parenthood 
As mentioned above， there are two relations of parent and child in the 
Japanese Civil Code: real parent and child in blood， and adoptive parent 
and child based on adoption. The former is divided further into two 
categories: legally married man and wife with their child (iegitimate child) 
and unmarried man and woman with their child (illegitimate child). 1 wil ex-
plain here the formation of these three kinds of parenthood and see 
in which cases the“adoptive parent and child in fact" can be brought 
forth. 
A. Real Parent and Child in Blood 
1) Legitimate Parent and Child 
We cannot自ndany difinition about the legitimate child in the Civil 
Code， but judgements and theories define that a child born between legal-
Iy married man and his wife is the legitimate child. Next， the Civil Code 
provides as follows in regard to the presumption of legitimacy.“(i) A child 
conceived by a wife furing marriage shall be presumed to be the child of 
the husband. (証)A child， born tWQ hundred days or more after the day 
on which the marriage was formed or born within three hundred days from 
the day on which the marriage was dissolved or annulled， shall be pre-
sumed to have been cOl1ceived during marriage." (Art. 772) Further 
provides the Civil Code about the legitimate child presumed as above .“11 
any case mentioned in Article 772， the husband may deny that the child is 
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legitimate." (Art. 774) That is， only the husband can deny the legitimacy 
of the child presumed by Art. 772， and thus such a child is strongly pro-
tected by these provisions. On the other hand， as for the legitimacy of a 
child falling outside of Art. 772 -e.ιa child born within 199 days after 
the marriage -not only the husband but also al the people who are coル
cerned can make a protest against its legitimacy. 
Now， a childラ whowas born as a legitimate child， may lose its father， 
if the Iegitimacy is denied. It would be rare that such a child would further 
live together with his ex-father as a member of the family， but if so would 
be the case， the child might be regarded as “adopted child in fact". 
2) IlIegitimate Parent and Child 
A child born between unmarried man and woman is the ilIegitimate 
child. In the Civil Code there is no distinction between the formation of 
the relation of father and child and that of the relation of mother and child. 
But judgements and theories modify it， distinguishing these two relations， 
and understand as follows: (a) the relation of father and child is formed 
according to the father's acknowledgment. The Civil Code provides that 
a child who is 10t legitimate may be acknowledged by his father (Art. 
779). An acknowledgemerit can be done through a formal notification to 
the ward office for family registration (Art. 781) (no approval of the 
spouse is required for this notification). In case the acknowledgement is 
not done， the relation of father and child wil be formed through the action 
for acknowledgement (a child， his lineal descendants and the lega1 repre鴨
sentative of any of them can bring an action for acknowledgement; 
however， this shall not apply after the lapse of three years from the time 
when the father died. (Art. 787)). 
If there is no father's acknowledgement nor judgement admitting the 
action for acknowledgement， a father and a child， even if they are real 
father and child in blood， cannot be legally admitted as parent and child. 
Following cases are given as such cases. (i) The father does not 
want to make the acknowledgement nor does the child bring any action 
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against the father. I) When they live togetherー thoughit is not seldom-
some legal effects can be given to them as“adoptive parent and child in 
白ct". (u) In case the father died without making any acknowledgement 
and it is already three years since he died， the child has no means to make 
the legal relation between his lost father and him. The child has no 
father for ever. ln this case， however， an “adopted child in fact" would 
seldom or never come into question. (b) As for the relation of mother 
and child， judgements and theories think in another way. The Civil Code 
treats father and mother equally in respect to the acknowledgement (Art. 
779) and the action for acknowledgement (Art. 787). Theories， however， 
have been laid stress on the substantial difference between the iIegitimate 
relation of白therand child and that of mother and child. The theories 
explain the following. It is very difficult to find outthe father of the child 
who was born from an unmarried woman. Therefore， itis necessary to 
take a certain legal step (acknowledgement or judgement) for the formation 
of the legal relation of a father and an iIlegitimate chiId. On the other 
hand， the relation of mother and child， differing from that of father and 
child， isquite clear from the fact of deIivery. Therefore， any acknowledge-
ment is not required for the formation of the relation of mother and child. 
An iIlegitimate relation of mother and child can be legally formed from the 
fact of delivery. This point of view of theories came to be admitted by the 
Supreme Court (27. 4. 1962). In short， as for the relation of mother and 
child， the blood relation accords with the legal relation as a rule， and so in 
the case of the relation of mother and child the “adopted child in fact" 
would not come into question. 
B. Adoptive Parent and Child 
Some legal conditions must be satisfied in order to form a relation of 
adoptive parent and child. These. conditions fal into two parts: formaIity 
1) It often happens that a fath巴rgives money or other property to his child or the mother to have 
them make no action for acknowledgement. The Supreme Court held that such an agreement， i. e. a 
renunciation of the right to require acknowledgement， was of no effect (10. 4. 1962.). 
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and substantiality. The formaI condition is notification (Art. 799)， and for 
substantiaI conditions the CiviI Code requires foIIowing things: (i) an 
adopter must be of fuI age (Art. 792)， (長)an ascendant or oIder person 
cannot be adopted (Art. 793)， (温)the adoption between ward and guardi-
an requires the Ieave from the FamiIy Court (Art. 794)， (iv) a person who 
has a spouse can make adoption only jointly wIth the spouse (Art. 795)， 
(v) if the person to be adopted is under 15 years old， the adoption wiI be 
concluded by his Iegal representative in his place (Art. 797)， and (vi) in 
order to adopt a minor child， th，e permission of the FamiIy Court must be 
obtained (Art. 798). 
There are cases where persons who have no blood relation live 
together without going through Iegal steps， and these are the principal 
cases which 1 am going to explain about in this article. The“adopted 
chiId in fact" is， inshort， a child adopted without satisfying the necessary 
legal conditions. Two situations can bethought as to the “adopted child 
in factヘ(i)though satisfying aI the substantial conditions described in 
the Civil Code， the adoption cannot be regarded as legal because of lack 
of the notification (the formal condition)， (証)and the adoption cannot be re-
garded as Iegal for lack of both the substantial and formal conditions. 
(Such a case as satisfying the formal condition in spite of lack of substan-
tial conditions would not happen normaIIy.) Why do the cases lacking 
such conditions happen? 
They result from the peculiarity of marriage procedures of the 
Japanese Civil Code， i， e.the peculiarity of adoption procedures copied 
from the marriage procedures. The Civil Code employs such a rule as 
without notification no marriage as to the formation of marriage. A mar-
riage can be admitted legaIIy only after the notification to the famiIy regis-
tration in the ward office (Art. 739)， and as for adoption， the Civil Code 
employs the same idea (Art. 799)， I.e. without notification no adoption. 
On the other hand， however， theJapanese traditional manners 
and customs are quite different. In Japan after marriage ceremonies and 
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parties、orwhen a man and a woman live together for some time， they are 
accepted as husband and wife socially. Here is a big difference between 
provisions of Civil Code and customs. In spite of the great efforts of the 
Government and those who are concerned， itstil remains as a big problem 
now. And for the protection of these people -who are not legally married 
but regarded as husband and wife socially -the theory "l1larriage in fact 
(NAIEN)" was invented2'. The sal1le thing can be applied to the adoption. 
Of course there are substantial differences between“husband and wife" 
and“parent and childへbutcustol1larily cerel1lonies and parties are often 
held for adoption and the parent and the child live together in the sal1le 
hOl1le. It comes now into question that there are also adoptive parent and 
child who are adl1litted socially but not legally because of lack of notifi-
cation， and how these people can be protected legally. This is the reason 
why the study of "adoptive parent and child in fact" is necessary as well 
as that of “marriage in在lct".
C. Other Problems 
After the World War Second the Constitution was revised、andin ac-
cordance with it the Civil Code was revised quite a 101. Many provisions 
which had been existing since 1898 were abolished. As the result there 
were brought forth following problel1ls. 
Under the old Civil Code til 1947、thestep parent and step child were 
legally admitted as parent and child. For instance， a second wife was 
automatically admitted as the legal mother of the child of the ex-wife. The 
present Code abolished this， for such a provision was derived from the 
feudal family system. Thus under the present Code no legal relation of 
parent and child exists between the second wife and the step child. 
They are each other only first degree relatives and have each other no 
right of succession. As a rule -except for the order of the FamilyCourt 
2) As for this matter， refer to my artic1e “NAIEN -One problem in Japanese marriage lawヘOsaka
University Law Review， 12， 1964. 
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(Art. 877) -no duty of supporting arises. If they want to become legal 
parent and child， they have to go through the procedure of adoption. 
However， there are stiIl many people who， being unable to get rid of the 
conception of the oId Code， believe that the second parent and step chiId 
are automaticaIIy IegaI parent and chiId， and making no adoption， they 
Ieave the case as it is. In this case， they. can be admitted as “adoptive 
parent and child in fact'¥FinaIIy， when a l1an and a woman are Iiving 
together without going through IegaI steps， and the man adopts a child 
legaIIy while no IegaI procedure is taken between the woman and the child， 
the chiId wiI be an“adopted child in fact" for the woman. 
II.“Adopted Child in Fact" Seen in the Court 
In the Iast chapter we have seen in which case an “adopted chiId in 
fact" appears. In this chapter we wiIl see in which case the court took up 
the matter as an “adopted chiId in fact" and gave to it IegaI effects. 
A. As we have seen in Chapter 1， an iIegaI adoption which is Iacking for 
legaI conditions faIls into two cases: the one is Iacking only for the formaI 
condition and the other for the substantiaI conditions. Between these we 
have to speciaIIy consider the latter， i. e. even if the case does not satisfy 
the substantiaI conditions， isit possible to regard the case as concerned 
with an“adopted child in fact"? The foIlowing case is about the ex-
istance of the duty of supporting. There the above mentioned matter is 
taken up， i. e， the CiviI Code describes one of the substantiaI factors for 
adoption as foIlows: in order to adopt a minor child， the permission of the 
FamiIy Court shaIl be obtained (Art. 798). Now itcame to be the point of 
issue whether an “adopted chiId in fact" can be _ applyed to， in case no 
permission from the Family Court was taken， and then based on this 
point， they took issue as to the existence of the duty of supporting. 
Sixteen-year明oIdplaintiff X made a promise of adoption with 
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man and wife (AA') in 1950， but they made no notification. He 
came to live together with A and A' and their daughther B-X's il-
legal wife. A wasold and weak. He owned only his house and 
litle field. His income was very small. Then X had to earn money 
to support A， A' and B as well as to pay for A's sick payment. 
In 1952 A died. X brought an action， asserting as follows: X was 
stil a minor in 1950 when he promised adoption with A and A'. 
Therefore， a permission from the Family Court would have had to 
be taken. But actually this permission was not taken， and so no 
adoption exists between X and AA'. Therefore， aIlthe money 
and medical expenses X had given to A before his death were 
unjust enrichment for A. Now X has the right to require the re-
found fromY who is A's heir-at..law. 
The District Court held that， the relation of living together among X 
and AA' can be regarded as the relation of “adoptive parent ancl child in 
fact" in spite of no permission from the Family Court. Therefore， itcan 
be thought as the duty of supporting based on the“adoptive parent and 
child in fact" that X paid for al the living expenses for A and his family. 
This is not A's unjust enrichments， and X's demand cannot be accepted. 
X further appealed to the High Court， which rejected it and judged as 
follows: a permission from the Family Court is not required in case a 
minor over fifteen years old establishes adoption in fact with the adoptive . 
parent in fact. According to this judgement， the“adoptive parent and 
child in fact" can be formed， even if the case is lacking for not only the 
formal condition but also substantial conditions. (Fukuoka， 13. 4. 1956) 
However， some theories disagree with this point. In fact as to the for-
mation of the “adoptive parent and child in fact" theories are really out of 
accordance. These are divided as follows : (i) the first theory insists that 
no substantial conditions are necessary， for the relation of “adoptive parent 
and child in fact" is formed， as well as the relation of “husband and wife 
in fact"， as social custom， regardless of legal steps. Therefore， the 
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substantial conditions are not necessarily required nor such formalities as 
ceremonies， change of letters or parties. The fact itself that the parent 
and the child are living together is enough. (i) The second theory insists 
that the substantial conditions have to be satisfied for th~ formation of 
the relation of “adoptive parent and child in .fact". According to this 
theory， only thecase which satisfies aIl the substantial conditions but is 
lacking for the formal condition (notification) can be legally protected as 
“adoptive parent and child in fact". (面)The third theory interprets it as 
follows: those who are concerned have to agree as to the adoption， but 
as for the other conditions for the formation should be considered from 
the viewpoint of the effects to be given -mainly compensation for the loss 
resulting from the dissolution. 
It is c1ear that the above mentioned judgement is derived from (i) or 
(ii)， and not from (証). The adoption is strongly under the guardianship of 
the Court to avoid a comouflaged unjust adoption (in the old days the 
human traffic was comouflaged in this way)， and protect the interest of the 
adopted child. From this toint of view， the theory No. (i) can be said to 
be right. However， thinking of the solution of an actual case， itseems to 
me thetheory No. (五)is too mirrow， for it might give the adopted child 
quite unjust disadvantages to always judge that“he is not an adopted child 
in fact because of lack of the substantial factorsぺwhenan actual issue 
arises. And further when we think that the Civil Code gives a special 
consideration to the interest of the adopted child separately from that of 
the adoptive parent， the theory No. (面)seems to be right rather than the 
theory No. (i) which treats the adoptive parent in fact and the adopted 
child in the same way. And in my opinion， the fact of living together is 
indispensable for the formation of the “adoptive parent and child in factヘ
though for the legal adoption this is not always required.. 'TI1 the above 
mentioned case the duty of supporting as the effect was the point of issue. 
Some of the effects which are given to the legal parent and child are given 
to the “adoptive parent and child in fact" Though such rights as the 
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surname， the relative relation and the right of succession which are based 
on the family registration are rejected， but the other effects can be given. 
The solution in this case is good. 
B. ，For instance， itis a question whether an “adopted child in fact" can 
further live in the same house， in which he has been living with the 
“adoptive parent in fact" after the latter's death. (This has beendisputed 
as to“husband and wife in fact". The situation is quite the same as to the 
“adopted child in fact".) N ow we wil see the case disputed in the Court. 
Defendant Y started to live together with K， a teacher of the 
l{.oto (Japanese harp)， as apprentice， inthe house which plaintiff X 
owned， in1942. While learning the Koto， Y took care of K who 
was blind and had no family. K promised to adopt Y， but did not 
make any procedure. In 1955 K died. X， the owner of the house， 
required the vacation of the house by reason of termination of lease. 
(K had six heirs-at-Iaw in total such as sisters， nephews and nieces.) 
The judgement of the Supreme Court is as folIows (25. 12. 1962). The 
right of lease of the house which K had occupied was transferred to the 
six heirs幽at-Iawdue to the death of K. On the other hand， K had made 
up her mind to adopt Y before her death and their relationship had de-
veloped from that of only teacher and apprentice into that of "adoptive 
parent and child in fact". This relationship was also admitted by their re-
latives and acquaintances. When K died， the following were decided 
among the relatives: Y would be the chief mourner， take over K's proper-
ty as well as K's professional name， and hold memorial services for K and 
her ancestors. Under such a situation Y was able to exercise the right to 
live in the very house， citing K's right of lease， as a member of K's family. 
K's heirs-at-Iaw took over the right of lease due to K's death， Y can insist 
the right to live in the same house citing the right K's heirs-at-Iaw have. 
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This judgement gives us two points of issue. First， ifthe heirs-at-law re-
quire the vacation of the house against the “adopted child in fact" of the 
person inherited， what wil become of it? Explaining that the matter 
should be solved considering the actual situations of both the “adopted 
child in fact" and the heirs肩at-Iawラ thetheory understands aIso .that the 
require of the heirs幽at-Iawshould be rejected as abuse of the right if the 
heirs“at-Iaw try to drive the “adopted child in白ct"out of the house in 
spite of no need on their side to use th house. Second is the case of no 
heir-at-Iaw. This problem was dissolved by the revision of the law of 
rented houses in 1966. Art. 7-2 of the Iaw defines as folIows: in case of 
no heir-at-Iaw， a husband (or a wife) in fact or parents (or chiId) in fact 
get the right and duty of lease. Through this provision an "adopted child 
in fact" can obtain the right. 
C. The adoption can be dissolved through presenting a notification to the 
ward office. On the other hand， no procedure is necessary for the dis-
solution of the relation of “adoptive parent and child in fact" ; the termina-
tion of the actuaI relation means the dissolution of the relation of “adoptive 
parent and child in fact". As for the termination of the actual relation of 
Iiving together as parent and ehild， thc;re are stil some problems. First， 
how is the termination made? No procedure is necessary for the dissolu-
tion of the relation of “adoptive parent and chiId in fact". (i) When the 
persons concerned agree to the dissolution and bring it to an end to Iive 
together， the relation of “adoptive parent and child in fact" wilI come to 
an end automatically. (u) Even in case the one of the persons concerned 
does not agree， no judgement from the Court cannot be expected. In the 
case of the Iegal adoption，. when one wants to dissolve and the other does 
not， the former can bring an action to the Court if there are some facts 
which fal in legal grounds (Art. 814). On the other hand， inthe case of 
the relation of “adoptive parent and child in fact勺theone who wants dis幽
soIution can freely bring the relation to an end even if the other opposes 
It. However， ifthe dissolution is based on unjust reasons， the other party 
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can seek aid against the Court. This is the problem of unjust dissolution 
of the relation of “adoptive parent and child in fact". The following case 
is about an issue whether the dissolution is just or unjust. 
Plaintiff X promised with defendants Y1 Y 2 and their daughter A 
to marry A as well as to be adopted by Y1 Y 2・ (Suchwas the 
typical case of adoption which had been existing in Japan til the 
end of the W orld War Second. In this case just a notification was 
enough. Under the present Code such a notification is not admitted， 
but the persons concerned can actually fulfil it by presenting two 
notifications -marriage and adoption.) X， as A's husband in fact， 
st弐rtedto live with Y1 Y 2 and A. But as A misconducted herself， 
the relation between X and A become worse， resulting in dis-
soIution of their relation as “husband and wife in fact". Then Y1 Y2 
requested X to dissolve the relation of the“adoptive parents and 
child in fact". X presented an action for compensation for damage 
insisting that Y1 Y/s request for dissolution of the 'relation of 
“adoptive parents and child in fact" is unjust. 
The action was rejected by the Family Court. The judgement was as 
follows. The Civil Code describes as to the dissolution in the Court; in 
case there is an grave reason for which it is impossible to continue the re-
Iation， an action for dissolution can be presented (Art. 814)， and according 
to the judgements of the Supreme Court (4. 8. 1964)， a person who is re-
sponsible for the breakdown of the relation cannot request dissolution. In 
this case， the relation between X and Ais already broken (for this break-
down Y1 Y2 are not be responsible)， and there is no more hope that mar-
riage and adoption exist at the same time in the future. This situation 
comes exactly under the grave reason for which it is impossible for Y1 Y 2 
to continue the relation (impossible to make a legaI notification for adop-
tion). It seems Y1 Y 2 have a grave reason to dissolve the relation of the 
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“adoptive parents and child in fact". (Kofu， 28. 11. 1958) 
D. Differing from the above mentioned several cases， the following 
matters have nothing to do direct with the concept “adopted child in factへ
but 1 would like to explain about some problems as follows， for though the 
concept employed might be different， the result brought about is the same. 
In 1962 the Civil Code created such an exactly new system as hardly 
found in foreign countries. It is usually called "the distribution of residu-
ary estate to specially related persons". Art. 958，..-3 provides as follows; 
“In the case of the preceoing article (the determination of the nonωexist幽
ence of heir-at-law)， the Family Court may， when it seems appropriateラ
give upon the petition whole or any part of the residuary estate after 
liquidition， to person who shared the same livelihood with the deseased 
(the person to be succeeded to)， to person who were engaged in nurcing 
the deceased， or to person who had special relations with the deceased". 3) 
It is not alwaysclear why such a system was created， but anyway it is at 
least clear that the legislator tried to give especially to the “spouse in fact" 
the possibility to get some of the property through this system. An ilegal 
spouse has no right of succession. No matter how long a man and a 
woman live together as husband andwife， they cannot inherit the property 
of the other on the occasion of the other's death. And if there is no 
heir-at-Iaw， the property is to belong to the National Treasury. 
Now the legislator intends the means the “spouse in fact" can get the 
property if there is no heir-at-law. This isthe typical example which 
fals under the expression a “person who shared the same livelihood 
with the deceasedヘandthe same thing can be applied to an “adopted 
child in fact" treated in this article. The following are the cases where an 
“adopted child in fact" acquires theproperty left by the“adoptive parent 
in fact" in the Family Court. 
a) T. K married Y. K， her husband， in1934. Y. K left for war in 1944， 
3) As for this matter， refer to my article:“The distribution of residuary estates to specially related 
persons: A new institution in the law of succession of JapanぺOsakaUniversityLaw Review‘17. 1969. 
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when there was no child between them. As it seemed quite doubtful for 
Y. K to return alive， judging from the war situation at that time， Y. K and 
T. K made an arrangement with A and his wife， to adopt the child which 
A's wife was expecting. The child， X， isthe plaintiff of this case. X oftert 
visited the family T. K who lived next door since childhood. T. K treated 
X with affection like her real child. T. K insured her life in an insurance 
company to secure the living of X after her death. Y. K was killed in war 
in 1945， but the official notice of his death arrived only in 1958. Then it 
was decided between T. K and her relatives that T. K would adopt X， 
X's husband would be chosen from the relatives of Y. K. and T. K's pro-
perty would be given to X after her death. T. K continued to live 
alone after that， but next door X and her family were living. T. K was 
used to ask advice of X and her family as to the superintendence of her 
property and other things， and X's mother visited T. K every dayラ when
T. K was hospitalized. T. K wanted to live together with X， and asked 
X's father to re-equip her house for this purpose， but two days after leaト
ing hospital T. K died. Her funeral was conducted by X's father 
with X as the chief mourner. The Court admitted X as the specially related 
person， and judged to give her T. K's land， house， stock certificatesラ
deposits and so on. (Osaka， 27. 1. 1965) 
b) Y worked for the landlord A. He had a smalI house constructed in 
the neighbourhood and lived together with his iIlegal wife. After his wife's 
death， his life became very inconvenient because he was already over 
seventy and had no children. Then his neighbour arranged adoption in fact 
between Y and Xs， the plaintiffs. Mr and Mrs. X moved to Y's house 
and cultivating his fields， took care of him. About ten years after that， Y 
felI sick， and attended on by Mr. and Mrs， X， died. The Court admitted 
for them to receive the fields. (Maehashi， 1.4. 1964) 
c) Y Iived together with M. N. after holding a wedding ceremony， but due 
to Iegal obstractions， they were unable to present a formal notification. 
They lived together as “ilIegal man and wife". As they had no child， X， 
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one of their relatives， was adopted when X was about five years old. The 
notification for adoption between X and M. N. was presented， but that of 
X and Y. not. M. N. died in 1928， and X succeeded to 'his business 
and was filial to Mother Y， living together with .her. In 1959 Y fel sick. 
Mr. and Mrs. X nursed Y tenderly. Y died in 1961. X conducted a 
funeral， erected a tomb， and has been holding a memorial service for her. 
The Court judged that X was able to occupy the house which Y had 
owned. (Fukui， 1.5.1964) 
IV. Conclusion 
1 have mentioned in which case so called an “adopted child in白ct"
can appear and how an “adopted child in fact" has been treated in the 
Court so far. Now 1 would like 'to mention some problems as the con-
clusion. As taken up case by case in the other article叫， there are many 
judgements made so far for a long time about “marriage in fact (N AIEN)" 
as weIl as many theories about this. It seems al the points at issue have 
been discussed about “marriage in fact". On the contrary， few problems 
have been taken up as to the formation and effects of “adopted child in 
fact". When we see the judgements or theories on “adopted child in fact" ， 
we wil find that it has been treated in parallel with “marriage . infact". 
However， itis rare that a case on “adopted child in fact" is brought to the 
Court， and so many problems about it are left unclear. It seems that it is 
necessary to pay more attention to the following differences between mar-
riage and adoption.鴨川ilemarriage depends only on the two persons 
concerned， the third party is to be concerned in the case of adoption， es-
pecially when a littIe child is adopted， e.~乙 the real parent. The nature of 
the formation is quite different between marriage and adoption. Marriage 
is based on the free wil of a man and a woman who have a equal stand-
point， but in the case of adoption， especiaIly when a minor is adopted， 
4) See，“NAIEN" op. cit. 
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there is a danger that the adopter might put pressure up the adopted child. 
That is why there are not a few provisions concerning. the formation of 
adoption to protect the adopted child against such dangers. The meanings 
of the conditions for the formation are not the same between marriage and 
adoption. The Civil Code is not expecting any marriage without the fact 
of living together， but it does not provide that“adoptive parent and child" 
should always live together. Therefore， itcomes to be a point of ・Issue
whether an “adopted child in fact" can exist without the fact of living 
together. (In my opinion the fact of living together is indispensable.) On 
many points marriage and adoption have differences. Th~refore， it is very 
questionable to discuss an “adopted child in fact" with the same logic as 
that of “marriage in fact". Finally 1 would like to explain about the impoト
tant matters of an “adopted child in fact" itself. The core of the law of 
parent and child is the parental power. The parental power consists of the 
right of custody and the right of management of property， which the child 
holds. As the former is admitted to be transferred to the third party by 
the Civil Code， it can be understood that the “adoptive parent" is 
entrusted with it by the real parent， but as far as the right of management 
of property is concerned， such an understanding cannot be accepted. 
There are many cases where the right of management of property is issued 
against the third party， but only a person who has the parental power 
or the position of guardian based on the Civil ‘Code can exercise 
this right. Therefore， the“adoptive parent in fact" can do nothing in 
regard to the property of the “adopted child in fact": (For instance， the 
former cannot make any effective agreement regarding the property of the 
latter.) The existence of the “adoptive parent in色ct"，who has such a 
limitation as to the parental power， seems to bring forth more problems. 
It should not be overIooked that the situation of the“adoptive parent and 
child in fact" is quite different from that of the“legal adoptive parent and 
child" in many points. 
